Abstract-This paper analyzes the return migration of foreign-born persons in the United States. We argue that return migration may have been planned as part of an optimal life-cycle residential location sequence. Return migration also occurs because immigrants based their initial migration decision on erroneous information about opportunities in the United States. The study uses the 1980 Census and administrative data from the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Immigrants tend to return to wealthy countries which are not too far from the United States. Moreover, return migration accentuates the type of selection characterizing the immigrant population left in the United States.
(as in the occupational mobility model of Rosen, (1972) ). In other words, some workers consciously decide to immigrate to the United States for a few years, and then return to their home countries after accumulating sufficiently large levels of capital or wealth. Alternatively, return migration flows may result from "mistakes" in the initial migration decision. Potential migrants in the source country are uncertain about the economic conditions they will face in the United States. As long as return migration costs are relatively low, workers who experience worse-than-expected outcomes in the United States may wish to return to their home country.
We begin by presenting a model that incorporates both motives for return migration. Suppose individuals originate in country 0 and consider the possibility of immigrating, either temporarily or permanently, to country 1 (for concreteness, the United States). The log earnings distributions in the source country and in the United States are described by:4 Wo = o+ nv, (1) Wi= y + + V+ e, (2) where MO is the mean log income in the source country, and ml is the mean income that would be observed if all persons in the source country migrated to the United States. The random variables v and e measure deviations from mean incomes, have zero means and finite variances, and are assumed to be independent. We also assume that v is known to the individual, while e remains unknown unless the individual migrates to the United States. We interpret v as reflecting ability or skills that are transferable across countries, while e reflects an uncertain component (perhaps due to misinformation or luck) in U.S. earnings. The parameter r, can be interpreted as the rate of return to skills in the source country relative to that in the United States.5
Upon arrival to the United States, the immigrant makes a draw from the known density g(e), and if the value of the random draw is sufficiently negative chooses to return to the source country immediately. The immigrant also knows, however, that a temporary stay in the United States might improve the economic options he faces in the source country. The simplest way of modeling the gains to the immigrant's investment is to assume that after spending a fraction r of the working life in the United States, immigrants can increase their earnings in the source country by K percent. We assume that the parameter r is constant, and that the individual's temporary stay in the United States, if it occurs at all, occurs at the beginning of the working life.6 Workers in the source country, therefore, have an additional option: residing in the United States for a fraction of the working life, followed by a permanent return to the source country. Ignoring discounting and using a first-order approximation, the log earnings associated with this choice are given by: wio = Irw1 + (1-i) (wo + K).
We assume that the (percentage) gain to a temporary stay in the United States, K, is constant among individuals.7 Workers choose the sequence of residential choices that maximizes their expected earnings, net of migration and remigration costs. Let M be a "time-equivalent" measure of 
Equation (4) states that a person in the source country migrates if either the expected wage from permanently migrating to the United States, or the expected wage from "investing" in a short stay in the United States exceeds the wage in the source country, net of the relevant migration and remigration costs. Equation (5) states that the sample of return migrants is generated from the subsample of persons who were migrants in the first place, and who have better opportunities in the source country (either in terms of wo or w10) than the actual income available in the United States (w1).9 For the investment motive to be relevant for return migration, we need to assume:10 4 The model presented below generalizes the Roy model framework (Roy (1951) ; Borjas (1987) ) to include the option of return migration.
S Note that the model assumes a perfect correlation between the skill components of earnings in the two countries (i.e., between v and rjv). Obviously, this assumption restricts the types of migration flows that can be generated. Borjas (1987) shows that if the correlation coefficient were sufficiently small or negative, the migration flow would resemble a refugee sorting: The immigrant flow is then composed of persons who do badly in the source country, but who have skills which are useful in the United States.
6 A more general model would allow for the endogeneity of the length of time spent in the United States.
7 Most of our findings are unaffected by a correlation between v and K as long as this correlation is not excessive.
8 It is easy to generalize the model to allow for variable migration costs. The qualitative nature of the results does not change as long as the correlation between migration costs and v is not excessive.
I We do not distinguish between persons who outmigrate immediately upon making a draw from the density g(E), and persons who remain in the United States for a fraction 3 of the work cycle and then return to the source country.
10 This condition is necessary if anyone is to migrate to the United States as part of a planned life-cycle mobility pattern which includes remigration to the source country. To see why, note that for a worker to expect to return to his source country, it must be the case that Ew1o -M -R > Ewl -M and Ew1o -M -R > wo. It is instructive to examine the characteristics of the migration flows when the distribution g(e) degenerates at e = 0, so that there is no uncertainty in the migration decision. Return migration can then only arise because a temporary stay in the United States increases the worker's earnings in the source country. The implications of the sorting summarized by equations (7)-(9) are illustrated in figure 1 for the case where r, < 1, and in figure 2 for the case where i> 1.
Suppose initially that ij < 1. The immigrant flow is positively selected (i.e., it is composed of workers with higherthan-average skills). Figure 1 also shows that the return migrant flow is composed of the least skilled immigrants. Intuitively, it is the highly skilled who gain the most by residing in the United States. The most skilled in this self-selected sample will wish to remain in the United States even if their economic opportunities improve in the source country. The least-skilled persons in this sample are the "marginal" immigrants. They are most responsive to changing economic conditions in the source country, and they will become return migrants in order to collect the returns on their investment.
Suppose instead that il > 1. The immigrant flow is now composed of workers of below-average skills. Because the rate of return to skills is higher in the source country, the most skilled have little incentive to immigrate to the United States. As figure 2 shows, even though the immigrant flow is relatively unskilled, it is the most skilled in this self-selected sample who find it optimal to become return migrants. Intuitively, workers with the lowest skill levels find it optimal to reside in the United States, regardless of whether or not there are gains to be made by migrating back to the source country. The sample of return migrants will be composed of marginal immigrants, who in this case happen to be relatively more skilled than the typical immigrant. Therefore, the return migration process intensifies the selection that characterizes the immigrant population in the United States. Because it is the marginal immigrants who leave, the immigrants who remain in the United States are the "best of the best" if there is positive selection, and the "worst of the worst" if there is negative selection.
The conditional probability of return migration, q, equals
The qualitative effects of the various exogenous parameters on this probability are given by 
The derivatives in (11) indicate that the return migration rate (the proportion of U.S. immigrants who leave the country) depends negatively on migration costs, M and R. In addition, it is easy to show that if both M and R are increasing functions of a common variable D, such as distance, the derivative aqiaD is negative. The outmigration rate also depends positively on K. If the earnings distributions are log-concave, a number of additional implications can be derived. For instance, the outmigration rate depends positively on mean income in the source country." Return migrants would rather return to rich than to poor countries. Further, the outmigration rate is first an increasing function and then a decreasing function of ir. Intuitively, the larger the difference between the rates of return to skills in the source country and the United States, the more that immigrants have to gain by staying in the United States, and the lower the outmigration rate.
The empirical analysis presented below indicates that our estimated return migration rates differ across source countries in ways that are generally consistent with these theoretical implications. Perhaps the most novel implication of the theory, however, is that return migration accentuates the type of selection that originally characterized the immigrant flow. Obviously, this result could be tested directly by comparing the earnings of the return migrants with those of the permanent immigrants, and determining if the differences between the two groups vary systematically among source countries according to the parameter ir. Unfortunately, currently available data do not generally allow this type of systematic analysis. Instead, we will use an indirect implication of the theory to test its predictive power. In particular, figures 1 and 2 indicate that holding constant the fraction of the source country's population that migrates to the United States, larger outmigration rates are associated with higher mean earnings for immigrants remaining in the United States if there is positive selection, and with lower mean earnings if there is negative selection.
As noted earlier, return migration can also arise as immigrants attempt to correct mistakes in the initial migration decision. As shown in the appendix, allowing for uncertainty in the migration decision introduces a number of complexities which require additional restrictions on the joint density h(v, e). Nevertheless, the analysis suggests that both the human capital and the uncertainty models lead to the same key insight: Return migration intensifies the selection that characterized the original immigrant flow. Given this similarity in the implications of the two models and the scarcity of data on return migration flows, it is unlikely that a simple test can be devised to distinguish between the competing hypotheses.
III. Data
We begin the empirical analysis by briefly describing the construction of our measures of outmigration rates for a large number of source countries. A detailed discussion of the data and the sensitivity of the estimates to alternative assumptions is given in Bratsberg (1991 A second problem with the Census data is that they contain a number of foreign-born students who are not legal immigrants (i.e., who have not adjusted status into permanent residence). Over 100,000 students entered the country annually during the 1970s. Internal INS calculations-obtained from the 1-53 forms that aliens residing in the United States were required to complete annually prior to 1980-report that 170,000 foreign students were present in the country in 1980.16 We use the source country distribution of foreign students admitted in the United States during the 1970s to allocate these students to particular national origin groups, and then subtract out the estimated number of foreign students from the Census counts.
Finally, the Census data enumerated some persons who entered the United States for lengthy business stays. Although the flow of business entrants is substantial, it has received little attention in the literature. We note that for some immigrant groups (e.g., Japanese immigrants in the late 1970s), the estimated outmigration rate is negative. In other words, even after the various corrections, the Census enumerated many more Japanese immigrants than were legally admitted by the INS. This problem probably arises because our correction for the presence of Japanese business persons in the Census counts was not sufficiently large. It is worth noting that this problem tends to disappear in the analysis of the earlier (1970-1974) cohort, and that with the exception of Japan and Taiwan, most of the countries with negative outmigration rates are relatively unimportant sources of immigration. In the empirical analysis reported below, we set the negative outmigration rates to a value of 0.0001.
We conclude this section by noting that our estimates are generally consistent with other studies addressing outmigration among immigrants. For example, Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) estimate upper and lower bounds on outmigration as of January 1979 among immigrants who arrived in the United States during the fiscal year 1971. While Jasso and Rosenzweig's estimates in general are higher than ours, the across country distribution of outmigration rates is very consistent with that in table 1. For the countries that overlap between the two studies, the simple correlation coefficient between Jasso and Rosenzweig's upper bound estimates and our figures for the 1970-74 cohort is 0.71. This lends additional credence to our analysis below, where we exploit the variation in outmigration rates across countries to test some of the predictions of our model.
IV. Determinants of the Outmigration Rate
Our estimates of the outmigration rate are obviously measured with substantial error. Nevertheless, we now show that the variation in these rates across national origin groups can be understood in terms of the basic economic characteristics that guide the outmigration decision. Table 2 presents regressions of the outmigration rate on various source country characteristics, including the source country's log per-capita GNP; the country's distance from the United States; whether the country has a communist regime; whether the country has recently experienced a coup or a revolution; and a measure of inequality in the source country's income distribution (which we interpret as a proxy for the rate of return to skills in the source country).21 To minimize the measurement problem, these regressions are estimated on the set of national origin groups and cohorts that had at least 125 persons enumerated in the 5/100 sample of the 1980 Census. The regression, therefore, contains only 119 observations (53 observations from the 1970-1974 cohort, and 66 observations from the 1975-1980 cohort). Table 2 presents both weighted and unweighted regressions (where the weight is given by the size of the immigrant flow in the out-migration equation), as well as regressions using both the linear probability model and a grouped probit specification.22
Regardless of which specification one considers, a key variable determining the outmigration rate is the per-capita GNP in the source country. Immigrants tend to return to rich countries, not to poor countries. This is precisely the implication of the theoretical model presented earlier. This effect is also numerically important: in the unweighted linear probability model regression, for example, a doubling of per-capita GNP increases the outmigration rate by 4.9 percentage points (using the specification in column 2). We use distance from the source country to the nearest major port in the United States as a proxy for migration costs. The regressions in table 2 indicate that distance has a strong negative impact on the outmigration rate. Not surprisingly, an immigrant is more likely to return to a nearby country than to a distant one. Every 1000-mile increase in distance between the United States and the source country reduces the outmigration rate by 1.2 percentage points.23
The regression also includes a measure of income inequality in the source country (defined by the ratio of income accruing to the top 10% of the households to the income accruing to the bottom 20% of the households). It is interesting to note that these data are highly correlated with the rates of return to schooling estimated by Psacharapoulos (1973) inequality measure (though this pattern is statistically insignificant in the unweighted regressions). The estimated coefficients suggest that the peak of this relationship occurs at a value of about 30, even though the sample mean is only 9.0, and the U.S. value of the inequality measure is 5.9.
The additional variables in the regression characterize the source country's political structure, which is presumably an important component in the calculation of return migration costs. The presence of a communist regime in the source country has a strong negative impact on the outmigration rate. Holding other factors constant, the return migration rate to communist countries is about 18 percentage points lower than that to other countries. Table 2 also presents analogous regressions using the inmigration rate-defined as the fraction of the source country's population that migrated to the United States-as a dependent variable. Although the two regressions are somewhat similar, they differ in one very striking way. In particular, the source country's per-capita GNP has a negative (though sometimes insignificant) impact on the in-migration rate, but a positive impact on the outmigration rate. This is precisely what one would expect if migration decisions are strongly affected by economic conditions in the source country (relative to those in the United States). The in-migration rate, like the outmigration rate, depends negatively on migration costs, as measured by distance. The impact of the political variables on the in-migration rate is harder to interpret, because local political conditions may prevent certain types of persons from leaving the country, The model presented in section II predicts that return migration tends to accentuate the selection that originally characterized the immigrant flow. In other words, if the immigrant flow is positively selected, the outmigrants will be less skilled (on average) than the immigrants who remain in the United States. Alternatively, if the immigrant flow is negatively selected, the outmigrants will be more skilled than the immigrants.who remain in the United States. Given the nature of Census-type data, it is not generally possible to conduct a direct test of this theoretical prediction because we have no direct measures on the skill composition of the return migration flow. Nevertheless, the Census data do allow an indirect test of the key theoretical insight.
The 
where wi is the wage rate of individual i; Xi is a vector of socioeconomic characteristics (defined below); and Ci1 is a dummy variable indicating if individual i is an immigrant born in country j. Equation (14) is estimated on the sample of working men aged 24-64 using the immigrant extract obtained from the 5/100 A File of the 1980 Public Use Sample, and a 1/1000 random sample of natives. The coefficient vector 6 gives the immigrant wage (relative to that of natives) in the 1980 cross-section for the various national origin groups. We estimate these relative wages separately for each of the two immigrant cohorts under analysis (by interacting all variables in the regression with a cohort dummy). We also use two alternative specifications of the vector Xi. First, we calculate the wage differentials without controlling for differences in demographic characteristics (giving the unadjusted relative wage of immigrants). We also estimate the wage differentials after controlling for differences in education, age (and age squared), marital status, health, and metropolitan residence. The resulting wage differentials among national origin groups are reported in table 3, where bj is the relative wage of national origin group j; rj is a dummy variable set to unity if the source country has a higher rate of return to skills than the United States; pj is the fraction of the source country's population that migrated to the United States; and qj is the fraction of the immigrant flow that returned to the country of origin. The specification in (15) captures the basic implications of our model of outmigration behavior. An increase in p, the fraction of the source country's population that migrated to the United States, should have a negative impact on immigrant earnings if the flow originates in a country with a lower rate of return to skills than the United States (i.e., c3 < 0). This occurs because the larger p, the more diluted the quality of the typical immigrant in a flow that is positively selected. By analogy, the coefficient c2 should be positive because the higherp, the greater the skills of the typical immigrant in a flow that is negatively selected.
The model also indicates that for given p, a higher outmigration probability increases the intensity of the selection characterizing the group of immigrants who remain in the United States. Holding p constant, therefore, an increase in q increases the earnings of "stayers" if the immigrant flow originated in a country with a low rate of return to skills, and decreases the earnings of stayers if the flow originated in a country with a high rate of return to skills. This implies that u4 < 0 and ct > 0.
To proxy for the rates of return to skills in the source country, we use our constructed measure of income inequality in the source country. We define a dummy variable X indicating if the source country has a higher rate of return to skills than the United States by comparing each country's value to the U.S. value (which is 5.91). 26 As before, we restrict the regression analysis to immigrant flows that are well-represented in the 1980 Census. Therefore, the regressions use only those national origin groups (and cohorts) that have 125 or more observations in the 5/100 Census file. We estimate equation (15) by pooling the two cohorts, giving us 119 observations that satisfy the sample size restriction. Table 4 reports generalized least squares estimates for a number of alternative specifications of the regression model.27 In particular, the regression is estimated using both the unadjusted and adjusted relative wages of national origin groups. Because of potential endogeneity of the variables p and q, the table also reports estimates based on two stage least squares.28 In addition, the regression specification is expanded to include the log per-capita GNP in the source country (relative to that in the United States), so as to control for the possibility that the skills obtained in industrialized economies are better valued by U.S. employers. This variable has been found to have a strong positive impact on immigrant earnings (Borjas (1987) ), and it remains positive in the specifications reported in table 4.
The empirical evidence indicates that an increase in the in-migration rate, p, from countries with low rates of return to skills lowers the average earnings of immigrants in the United States. The regressions, however, do not always indicate that an increase in migration from countries with high rates of return to skills increases the average earnings of immigrants. However, when this coefficient is negative, it is insignificant, and is much lower (in absolute value) than the respective coefficient for countries with low rates of return. Note: The t-ratios are reported in parentheses. The dummy variable r is set to unity if the source country has more income inequality than the United States; p gives the fraction of the source country's population that migrated to the United States; and q gives the fraction of the immigrant flow that returned to the source country. The regressions use a generalized least squares estimator to correct for the heteroscedasticity in the dependent variable. The regressions have 119 observations. 26 We also estimated a model where the difference in income inequality between the source country and the United States is interacted with the in-and out-migration probabilities (rather than the dummy indicating if this difference is positive or negative). Although the results tend to be similar, we report the simpler specification because of the large amount of measurement error implicit in the income inequality measures. 27 Because the dependent variable is an estimated coefficient from a firststage regression, the disturbance in the regression is heteroscedastic, with the variance of the error term depending on the standard error of the regression coefficient. To correct for this problem, we used a generalized least squares estimator. For details, see Borjas (1987) . 28 The instruments are predicted values from reduced form regressions on per-capita GNP, x, distance from the United States, whether the source country has a centrally planned economy, whether the source country experienced irregular executive transfers (i.e., a non-constitutional transfer of power in the executive branch), a dummy variable for the cohort, and dummies for the continent of origin. . This is precisely the pattern in conditional means predicted by our model as long as Puerto Rico has a higher rate of return to skills than the United States. In fact, the rate of return to education in Puerto Rico is about 1.5 times the rate of return to education in the United States. It is not surprising, therefore, to observe the least skilled Puerto Ricans migrating to the United States, and to observe the most skilled among these workers eventually returning to their birthplace.
VI. Summary
This paper presented a theoretical and empirical analysis of return migration behavior. Our theoretical model of return migration generates surprisingly strong predictions regarding the size and skill composition of the population flows. Perhaps the most striking implication is that return migration intensifies the type of selection that generated the immigrant flow in the first place. In other words, if the immigrant flow is positively selected, so that immigrants have above-average skills, the return migrants will be the least skilled immigrants. In contrast, if the immigrant flow is negatively selected, the return migrants will be the most skilled immigrants.
A second contribution of our analysis is the construction of a series of outmigration rates for 70 source countries. We constructed these statistics by combining two data sources: the 1980 U.S. Census, and a recently available microdata set constructed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service which reports a number of demographic characteristics for every legal immigrant admitted into the United States since 1972. Our estimated outmigration rates exhibit substantial variation across national origin groups, and indicate that immigrants tend to return to countries that are not distant and that are not poor.
Finally, our empirical analysis confirms the theoretical prediction that the skill composition of the return migrant flow depends on the type of selection that generated the immigrant flow in the first place. Because of the selective nature of return migration, the skill composition of the immigrant pool left behind in the United States is substantially different from that of the original immigrant flow. This finding has significant implications for studies of the economic impact of immigration and for immigration policy. In view of the growing importance of immigration as a component of demographic change in the United States, it is clear that the economic and social impacts of nonrandom return migration flows will need to be explored intensively in future research. After arrival in the United States, the immigrant makes a random draw from the g(E) density, and reconsiders the profitability of his original decision. Obviously, the decision of whether to return to the source country depends on whether the draw is favorable or unfavorable. As figures A-1 and A-2 indicate, only those persons who have relatively unfavorable draws become return migrants (regardless of whether there is positive or negative selection). Some workers who expected to migrate temporarily to the United States now will settle permanently because they receive particularly favorable draws. Others who expected the move to be permanent will return to the source country because of unfavorable draws.
As long as p(v, E) = 0, it is easy to show that the skill composition of the return migration flow in this model is identical to the sorting implied by the human capital model presented above. If n < 1, return migrants are relatively unskilled workers (selected from a skilled immigrant flow), while if n > 1, return migrants are relatively skilled workers (selected from an unskilled immigrant flow). As before, return migration accentuates the selection that characterizes the original immigration. These results are trivially implied by figures A-1 and A-2 because the random variable v for return migrants is truncated from above when n < 1, and from below when n > 1.
Although these insights exactly parallel those obtained earlier, they do not completely describe the economic experiences of immigrants and return migrants in the United States. In particular, U.S. earnings now depend not only on As before, the actual earnings of return migrants are lower than the actual earnings of immigrants who remain in the United States. This follows from equation (A-1) because the return migrants are less skilled than the "stayers," and the conditional expectation of E is higher for stayers than for the return migrants. This implication, however, cannot be derived when q > 1 unless more structure is imposed on the joint density h(v, E). The problem is that the immigrants who stay in the United States have the lowest v's and the highest E's. One possible restriction on h(v, E) is that the random variable v has a sufficiently larger variance than the random variable E. It can then be shown that the earnings of those who stay in the United States are lower than the earnings of those who return home.
